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Abstract: Smart energy systems (SESs), with integrated energy sectors, provide several advantages
over single-sector approaches for the development of renewable energy systems. However, cross-sector
integration is at an early stage even in areas challenged by the existing high shares of variable renewable
energy (VRE). The promotion of cross-sector integration requires institutional incentives and new
forms of actor participation and interaction that are suitable to address the organisational challenges
of implementing and operating SESs. Taking as the point of departure an empirical case and its
institutional context, this article presents an exploratory study of the ability of cross-sector consumer
ownership at different locations in the power distribution system to address those challenges in
Denmark. The methods comprise interviews of relevant stakeholders and a literature review.
The results indicate that distant and local cross-sector integration will be necessary to reduce
overinvestments in the grid and that consumer co-ownership of wind turbines and power-to-heat
(P2H) units in district heating (DH) systems may provide advantages over common separate
ownership with regard to local acceptance and attractiveness of investments. Several possibilities
are identified to improve the current institutional incentive system in Denmark. Finally, the results
suggest the relevance of analysing the possibility for single-sector energy companies to transition to
smart energy companies.
Keywords: smart energy system; renewable energy system; sector integration; consumer ownership;
local ownership; prosumer; organisational innovation
1. Introduction
A drastic reduction in global CO2 emissions is crucial to mitigate global warming and its
devastating consequences [1]. Therefore, the EU has set the target to reduce its greenhouse gas
emissions by 80–95% compared to 1990 by 2050 [2]. Achieving this target requires the substitution
of fossil fuels, with significant reductions in energy demand and a high penetration of VRE [2]. This
implies fundamental changes in the energy system—most remarkably, the significant loss of flexibility
on the production side (previously provided by easily and cheaply storable fossil fuels) and the
decentralisation of the energy system (in order to harvest local energy resources with modular/scalable
technologies such as wind turbines and solar panels). These changes are not only of a technical
nature as they are expected to demand and open up important organisational changes, including new
business models and the possible reconfiguration of the energy system’s ownership [3–5]. Furthermore,
the new EU Renewable Energy Directive and Electricity Market Directive, which include definitions
for “renewable energy communities” and “citizen energy communities”, respectively, could also foster
ownership changes by promoting the implementation of renewable energy projects with open and
participatory forms of citizen ownership in the EU Member States.
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As the implementation of VRE progresses, these technologies are facing greater local opposition [6],
lower market prices due to the merit-order-effect, and curtailment due to electricity grid congestion [7].
Several studies conclude that these organisational challenges could be addressed with cross-sector
integration (i.e., by integrating the electricity, heating and cooling (H&C), and transport sectors) [8,9]
and local inclusive ownership models [10], such as local consumer cooperatives or local municipal
companies [11]. However, the institutional incentive system does not yet promote these solutions
to the levels that are necessary to address the above mentioned challenges and to implement a
renewable SES [12], not even in countries and local regions already pressed by the high shares of VRE,
e.g., Denmark.
Denmark is a frontrunner in wind turbine implementation—wind turbines supplied 46.7% of
the final electricity demand in 2019 [13]. Moreover, about 64% of the households in the country are
connected to DH systems [14]. However, only 1.1% of the heat demand in DH systems was supplied
by heat pumps (HPs) in 2018 [14], which indicates a very low integration of the electricity and H&C
sectors, in spite of the existing high potential for it. Denmark is also well known for its significant
levels of local and inclusive ownership of the energy system [11,15]. Nevertheless, since the second
half of the 1990s there has been a trend for exclusive and distant ownership of wind turbines, which is
one of the reasons for the observed increase of local opposition to them [6,11].
The country has the target to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 70% by 2030 and to become
fossil fuel-free by 2050. The achievement of these ambitious targets requires the improvement of the
Danish institutional incentive system and possibly new forms of local and inclusive ownership in
order to address the mentioned organisational challenges and foster the implementation of a SES [12].
The current Danish institutional incentives do not differentiate between nearby or distant cross-sector
integration [12]. This is seen as problematic given that cross-sector integration is expected to reduce
electricity grid costs by reducing congestion issues [8,16], which have a strong locational character [7].
Moreover, the current electricity spot market structure makes it necessary for wind investors to access
support schemes or arrange beneficial power-purchase-agreements (PPAs) in order to make wind
projects economically attractive [17]. In this respect, the abolition of the feed-in tariff scheme and the
introduction of the tender scheme considerably reduces the possibility for wind projects with local
inclusive ownership to have access to support schemes and favours large commercial wind investors
instead [18,19]. Furthermore, the current institutional incentive system completely fails to promote
local acceptance of wind turbines in Denmark—proven by the fact that 305 MW of wind capacity was
cancelled in 2017 in the country because of protests [20].
In such a changing and hostile environment, local and inclusive ownership of wind turbines
continues to develop in Denmark through innovative forms such as local cross-sector consumer
ownership, e.g., in Hvide Sande, where the local DH company has bought the local wind turbines [11].
Hvelplund et al. [12] suggest that such cross-sector consumer ownership models might be advantageous
to address the organisational challenges of implementing SESs [12]. However, the idea has not been
empirically studied yet and that is what the study presented in this article intends to do.
Taking as a point of departure the case of Hvide Sande, this article presents an exploratory analysis
that answers the following research questions:
1. What is the (theoretical) ability of cross-sector consumer ownership at different locations to
address the organisational challenges of SESs in Denmark?
2. How does the current Danish institutional incentive system encourage/discourage cross-sector
consumer ownership at different locations in the power distribution system?
3. Based on 1 and 2, how could the Danish institutional incentive system be improved to better
address the organisational challenges of SESs?
4. What issues regarding ownership and SESs can be identified for further research?
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Section 2 presents the theoretical approach and methodology of the study. Section 3 is divided
into four sub-sections, which answer research questions 1–4, respectively. Finally, Section 4 discusses
the results of the study.
2. Theoretical Approach and Methods
2.1. SESs and their Interrelations
SESs are renewable energy systems that comprise smart electricity, thermal and gas grids and are
characterised by integrated electricity, H&C, and transport sectors [16]. Figure 1 presents the interrelations
between the implementation and operation of the SES, the incentive system, the political system/process,
the available resources, and the cognitive/cultural characteristics. The diagram is an adaptation of those
presented by Hvelplund et al. [12] and Gorroño-Albizu et al. [11]. The differentiation of “the technical
system” and the “actor participation and interaction” presented in Figure 1 intends to emphasise the need to
better understand potential organisational possibilities (including different ownership models) for SESs
as well as their interrelation with the technical system and the institutional incentive system. Figure 1
suggests that the characteristics of the technical system could influence which/how actors participate in
the implementation and operation of the energy system. Thus, different types of actor participation and
interactions could be expected, e.g., for centralised and decentralised energy systems. At the same time,
the figure suggests that different actor participation and interactions could lead to implementation and
operation of the technical energy system in a different way. In this sense, different implementation and
operation behaviours could be expected for VRE and P2H in DH systems, e.g., when being owned by
different companies belonging to different sectors (which is currently the norm) or by one single (cross-sector)
company (i.e., when being regarded as one single system). This understanding motivates the analysis of the
co-ownership of wind turbines and P2H by DH companies presented in this article. Such co-ownership
represents a cross-sector ownership model. Finally, Figure 1 suggests that, in order to understand the
implementation and operation of SESs, it is important to comprehend how the incentive system influences
both the technical system and the actor participation and interaction [11].
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Figure 1. The theoretical approach of the study, inspired by [12] and [11]. The white boxes in the
diagram present the elements of SESs included in the scope of the study. The interactions between the
actors are not drawn because questioning and analysing those interactions is one of the objectives of
the study. DH: district heating.
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Figure 1 also presents the delimitations of the study. The study focuses on VRE infrastructure
(particularly wind turbines), the electricity grid, and P2H in DH systems. Individual heating systems
and other forms of cross-sector integration as well as the end consumers’ energy system are outside of
the scope. The study analyses the present “rules of the game” but not the political process behind
these rules or the end consumers’ political influence. However, the study indirectly considers the
end consumer through the consumer-owned DH companies and the local community through the
local planning authority. Finally, the cognitive/cultural characteristics that have influenced the actor
participation and interaction and the dominance of consumer-owned DH companies in Denmark are
outside of the scope. The delimitations of the study are defined in line with the problem formulation
and the research questions presented in the introduction.
2.2. The Organisational Challenges of SESs, Ownership and Location
The organisational challenges considered in this study are: (1) reduction of overinvestments in
the electricity grid, (2) enhancement of local acceptance of wind turbines, and (3) improvement of the
economy of wind turbines and P2H in DH systems. In the following it is explained how these three
challenges are related to the ownership of the technical SES based on existing literature. Furthermore,
the relevance of the location aspect, already mentioned in the introduction, is highlighted. These
knowledge forms the theoretical background to answer the research questions.
2.2.1. Reduction of Overinvestments in the Electricity Grid
Increasing flexible demand through cross-sector integration may reduce the need for expanding
and reinforcing the electricity transmission grid in order to integrate high shares of VRE [8]. This
requires that investments (in VRE, P2H in DH systems and the electricity grid) and operations (of VRE
and P2H units) are coordinated with regard to three key aspects: time, size, and location.
The complexity of the necessary coordination to minimise the overall system costs arises from
the multiple actors, interests, and institutional incentives that intervene in investment and operations’
decision-making, as indicated in Figure 1. Based on a preliminary analysis made for Denmark,
Hvelplund and Djørup [3] suggest that local consumer ownership of SESs would facilitate the necessary
coordination. In line with that idea, Gill et al. [21] argue that co-ownership is the easiest solution
for local coupling of wind power generation and local demand with the purpose of avoiding wind
power curtailment due to grid congestions. Moreover, the analysis carried out by Gill et al. indicates
that co-ownership reduces the transaction costs of local balancing. The main reason behind those
authors’ arguments is that, in a co-ownership configuration, there is only one decision-maker for the
investments in and operations of the wind turbines, the P2H units, and the rest of the components of
the DH system (e.g., thermal storage, solar collectors, combined heat and power (CHP) plants, etc.),
which are regarded as parts of the same system [22]. This facilitates the coordination.
2.2.2. Local Opposition to Wind Turbines
Local opposition to wind turbines is a well-documented phenomenon that has caused delays and
cancellation of projects. Similar public reactions towards other VRE technologies could be expected as
their implementation increases. Reducing the need for wind capacity through, e.g., efficiency measures
would result in lower conflicts. Nonetheless, addressing possible local conflicts and enhancing local
support is essential. To this end, participatory planning processes and a fair distribution of local
impacts and benefits are recommended [23]. In this respect, local and inclusive citizen ownership has
proven to be an effective solution [10] as it confers the local community the control over the decisions
on the wind turbine project and ensures broad distribution of benefits between the members of the
local community. Gorroño-Albizu et al. [11] provide examples of local and inclusive citizen ownership,
which include, e.g., local consumer cooperatives and local municipal companies.
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2.2.3. Attractiveness of Investments in VRE and P2H in DH Systems
The levelised cost of wind power has decreased significantly in the past decades, reaching similar
or even lower levelised costs per MWh than those of fossil fuel technologies [24]. However, the merit
order effect and curtailment because of grid congestion reduce the profitability of wind investments as
increasing volumes of wind power enter in the electricity system. Increasing flexible demand through
cross-sector integration (e.g., P2H) has been presented as a solution to raise wind energy utilisation
and, in this way, improve wind economy [9,12]. Therefore, the co-ownership of wind turbines and
flexible demand (e.g., P2H in DH systems) could improve the economy of wind turbines—as long as
both are located within the same electricity grid congestion node [21].
Some studies have investigated the role of ownership in the attractiveness of investments in
wind turbines (see e.g., [25,26]) and in DH systems (see e.g., [27]). The differences in attractiveness of
investments is to some extent related to the fact that different types of investors seek different levels
of profitability and investment time horizons. The think-tank Grøn Energi [28] argues that shorter
or longer time horizons and higher or lower expectations for returns in investments have important
implications for the investment choices and future competitiveness of DH systems. In this regard,
according to Grøn Energi, long time horizons—which are often preferred by consumer and public
investors rather than by commercial investors—will be extremely important to ensure the adoption of
more sustainable and flexible technologies (including solar collectors, thermal storage, and HPs). This
could imply that wind turbines might also be attractive for consumer-owned DH companies (with
P2H units) who seek for long-term return in investments.
2.2.4. SESs, Cross-sector Ownership and Different Location Cases
From the above explanations it may be concluded that the location of the technical system’s
components and the ownership influence the ability to address the organisational challenges presented
in this study. Therefore, this study analyses the co-ownership of wind turbines and P2H by
DH companies implemented at different location cases. These are (1) distant, (2) local, and (3)
behind-the-meter cross-sector integration, as presented in Figure 2. The location cases should not be
regarded as either/or alternatives as they already co-exist and will probably still do so in the future.
Nevertheless, they are differentiated in order to assess their influence in the ability of the co-ownership
solution to address the organisational challenges of SESs.
2.3. Methodology
Semi-structured interviews and literature review are used to answer the research questions of the
study. The interviews were conducted mainly with the stakeholders forming the institutional context
in which the case of Hvide Sande is embedded in line with the theoretical approach presented in
Figure 1. To the best knowledge of the author, Hvide Sande DH is the only DH company in Denmark
that owns wind turbines. Therefore, the input from the stakeholders involved in this case is expected
to provide insights about the co-ownership model that other stakeholders might not hold. Moreover,
the expertise of Ringkøbing DH, who has explored and discarded the possibility of implementing the
co-ownership solution, is also collected. Additionally, a DH consultant has been interviewed to deepen
the understanding about the operation of DH systems. Table 1 lists the interviewed stakeholders.
Written transcripts were compiled for the interviews.
The objective of the interviews is to understand the (theoretical) ability of the co-ownership model,
how the technical system and institutional context are influenced by different ownership models,
and how the incentive system encourages/discourages different ownership models. The specific
experiences by Hvide Sande DH are out of the scope of the study as they do not answer the research
questions. The interviews had different focuses, related to the expertise of the interviewed stakeholder.
The questions for grid operators were targeted at understanding the challenges of implementing
higher shares of VRE and electrifying the H&C sector as well as the benefits that different cross-sector
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integration cases, presented in Figure 2, could provide for solving the expected electricity grid issues.
The questions for DH companies and the DH consultant were targeted at understanding the operation
of the DH system (with and without wind turbines), the economic attractiveness of investing in wind
turbines for a DH company under the current institutional incentive system, and the possibility of
obtaining local acceptance of wind turbines. Finally, the questions for the local planning authority were
targeted at understanding the local energy system and the interactions between the local stakeholders.
The interviews also made it possible to capture different opinions on the advantages and disadvantages
offered by the different cross-sector integration cases and the consumer cross-sector ownership model
under analysis in this study. These opinions are presented as part of the analysis in the results section.
The list of interviewed stakeholders is small and therefore only a limited understanding about
stakeholders’ expectations regarding cross-sector integration and cross-sector ownership and about
relevant research lines regarding ownership and SESs are captured. Nevertheless, this exploratory
study advances the existing knowledge about the suitability of institutional incentives and ownership
models for SESs and is expected to build a stronger knowledge basis for further research on the topic.
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Table 1. List of interviewed stakeholders. HP: heat pump; TSO: transmission system operator; DSO:
distribution system operator.
Stakeholder Interviewee Description
DH Company Hvide Sande DH [29]
Hvide Sande DH owns wind turbines and
an electric boiler in a behind-the-meter
solution.
DH Company Ringkøbing DH [30] Ringkøbing DH owns an electric boiler anda HP.
Local Planning Authority Ringkøbing-SkjernMunicipality [31]
Hvide Sande DH and Ringkøbing DH are
located in this municipality.
Ringkøbing-Skjern is a rural municipality
with high shares of VRE and ambitious
municipal energy targets.
DSO RAH Net [32]
RAH Net is the local consumer-owned DSO.
Hvide Sande DH and Ringkøbing DH are
connected to RAH Net’s electricity grid.
TSO and Market Operator Energinet [33] Energinet is the Danish TSO and marketoperator.
DH Consultant EMD International [34]
EMD International is an energy systems
software company that provides
consultancy to DH companies for the
improvement of their operations’ strategy.
3. Results
The section is divided into four sub-sections, which answer research questions 1–4, respectively.
3.1. The (Theoretical) Ability of the Consumer Cross-sector Ownership Model in Different Location Cases to
Address the Organisational Challenges of SESs
This sub-section answers research question 1. The sub-section starts by explaining the operation of
wind turbines and DH systems (i.e., the technical SES) in a co-ownership solution and continues with
the analysis of the (theoretical) ability. The analysis builds up on the theoretical approach presented in
Section 2.1. and Section 2.2.
3.1.1. The Operation of the Wind Turbines and the DH System in a Co-Ownership Solution
DH companies determine their optimal operational strategy (i.e., the one that meets the heat
demand at the lowest possible cost) for the portfolio of technologies available and for every hour [22].
In Denmark, the portfolio may consist of CHP units, boilers, P2H units, solar collectors, waste heat from
nearby companies, and thermal storages [14]. Therefore, the calculation of the optimal operational
strategy may include production and storage capacities, demand estimation, sun energy resource
estimation, and fuel, heat, and electricity prices [22]. In the case of Hvide Sande, where the DH company
also owns wind turbines, the calculation also includes wind resource estimation, the market price wind
power could get, and the cost of self-consuming the wind power [22]. In this case, the operational
strategy defines, among others, when to sell the wind power in the electricity market and when
to self-consume it [22,29]. This means that, as suggested by the theoretical approach presented in
Figure 1, the operation of the wind turbines and the P2H unit are different in the co-ownership solution
implemented in Hvide Sande and the separate ownership solution that is currently the norm.
Hvide Sande DH argues that they—deliberately—built a (smart) energy system that reduces the
curtailment of the local wind turbines and the DH system’s natural gas consumption while keeping
in consideration the need for the wind power in the Danish electricity system. According to the DH
company, they self-consume the wind power in periods with low power electricity market prices
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(i.e., when the demand/value of wind power in the market is low) and they sell it in periods with high
electricity market prices (i.e., when the demand for power is high) [29].
EMD International pointed out that the understanding of “high” or “low” power prices by the
DH company is subjective as it based on the alternatives that the DH company has to meet the energy
demand. During sunny summer days, with low heating demand and high (cheap) heat production
from the solar collectors, the DH company may not need (all) the wind production to cover the heat
demand and could decide to sell the electricity at lower prices than in winter, when the alternative to
self-consumption of wind power could be to operate the (expensive) natural gas boilers. Therefore,
EMD International argues that the self-consumption or sale of wind power is not optimised from the
Danish electricity system perspective, but from the DH company’s perspective; i.e., by not making
the wind power available in the Nord Pool market at all times, the co-ownership solution results in
“sub-optimisation” of the electricity system [34].
The remark made by EMD International indicates that this stakeholder assumes that the (current)
institutional incentive system optimises the operation of the electricity system. This is in line with
Energinet’s opinion [33]. However, the current institutional incentive system is still strongly influenced
by the path dependency of a centralised and fossil fuel energy system with separated energy sectors [12]
(as further explained in Section 3.2). One of the consequences is that the current market structure,
in combination with electricity grid tariffs and taxes, results in curtailment of wind power (which is
assumed not to have any market value) in moments with transmission grid congestions while flexible
electricity demand from P2H units in DH systems has not been activated and fossil fuels are being burnt
to meet the heat demand of the DH systems [29,30]. This means that the curtailed wind power could
have actually had a market value. Therefore, the optimisation of the national electricity (or energy)
system through the electricity market and other institutional incentives is also questionable. Moreover,
it is not clear if, under the current institutional incentive system, the separate ownership solution
results in a better or worse optimisation of the energy resources than the co-ownership solution.
Some of the remarks made by EMD International [34] and Energinet [33] show a rather technocratic
approach, where it is assumed that, while keeping the traditional single-sector or separate ownership
solution, the right combination of institutional incentives will lead to the optimal operation of the energy
system with regard to the political/societal goals. In contrast, scholars of sustainable socio-technical
transitions advocate for creating spaces for experimentation and nourishing of niches in order to allow
for innovation that could lead to fundamental changes, in this case, in the energy system [35–37].
Therefore, this preliminary study intends to break with the path dependency of the single-sector
ownership approach and explore the (theoretical) ability of consumer cross-sector ownership to address
the organisational challenges of SESs.
3.1.2. The Location Cases for Cross-Sector Integration and the Reduction of Overinvestments in the
Electricity Grid
Grid issues are dependent on the characteristics of the local grid [7]. In the following, a basic
technical analysis is provided of what, why, and where electricity grid issues may arise in Denmark as
result of the increase of installed VRE capacity in a scenario where no mitigation strategy (e.g., grid
reinforcement and expansion or cross-sector integration) is implemented. The technical understanding
is essential to discuss the ability of the three different cross-sector integration cases presented in Figure 2
(i.e., distant, local, and behind-the-meter) to address grid issues in Denmark.
The grid issues introduced in the following and in Figure 3 are limited to the scope of the study and
the inputs provided by the interviewed grid operators. The grid issues that could arise at transmission
and distribution levels due to the implementation of P2H units in DH systems are not discussed
in the following. The reason is that, according to the interviewed grid operators, these issues are
well-addressed by the current institutional incentive system, which promotes the flexible operation of
P2H units in DH systems to avoid grid congestion [32,38].
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Figure 3. Potential grid issues that could be caused by increasing shares of VRE in a scenario where no
mitigation strategy (e.g., grid reinforcement and expansion or cross-sector integration) is implemented
illustrated on a schematic representation of the electricity grid in Denmark. DK1 and DK2 are the two
electricity market zones in Denmark. DS1 and DS3 represent the distribution system areas with high
shares of VRE and DS2 and DS4 the distribution system areas with high electricity and heat demand.
The dashed lines represent the transmission voltage connection to other market zones. For a more
detailed representation of the Danish electricity grid, see [39] and, e.g., [40]. DS: Distribution system.
Denmark’s electricity system is rather decentralised compared to other EU and industrialised
countries. About 50% of the electricity generation is directly fed into the electricity distribution grid
nowadays, in contrast to 1%–2% in 1980 [41]. Wind turbines, photovoltaic panels, and small-scale
CHP plants have been connected to the electricity distribution grids, which has required and resulted
in stronger electricity distribution grids than in other EU countries [7]. The total installed electricity
generation capacity in 2018 was 15,073 MW, divided into 6121 MW wind (4420 MW onshore and
1701 MW offshore), 5402 MW large-scale power plants (815 MW electricity only and 4586 MW
CHP plants), 1904 MW small-scale CHP plants, and 998 MW solar, 9 MW hydro, and 639 MW
autoproducers [14]. In addition, Denmark is strongly connected to the neighbouring countries [39,42].
Currently, there is no congestion issue at the electricity distribution level in Denmark; the congestion
issues are at the transmission level between market zones [7,33] (see Figure 3). This means that,
in moments when the local electricity production e.g., in DS1, exceeds the local electricity demand in
DS1, the excess electricity is exported to other parts of the electricity system through the transmission
Energies 2020, 13, 1508 10 of 23
grid, e.g., to DS2 and even to DS4 and neighbouring market zones as long as the transmission grid
connecting the different market zones is not congested.
In some Danish municipalities, wind and solar energy produce as much as 500% of the annual
electricity demand (these are DS1 and DS3 in Figure 3). In Ringkøbing-Skjern municipality, the
share is about 150%. In others, the share is only about 1% (these are DS2 and DS4 in Figure 3) [43].
At the beginning of 2017, the distribution system operator (DSO) NOE Net (which covers fully or
partly the municipalities of Holstebro, Lemvig, Struer, and Herning [44]) estimated that there were
periods when the exports from their grid were 0.1% of the local electricity demand and expected this
number to increase with the connection of the planned new wind turbines [45]. In a scenario where no
mitigation strategy (e.g., grid reinforcement and expansion or cross-sector integration) is implemented,
the increase of VRE capacity in DK1, DK2, and the neighbouring energy systems could result in:
(A) An increase amount of hours with transmission grid congestions in DK1 and DK2. DK1 and DK2
are the two electricity market zones in Denmark. This problem occurs in moments when the
electricity production in DK1 and/or DK2 exceeds the electricity demand in DK1 and/or DK2 and
the transmission connections to other market zones are fully utilised. The result is the curtailment
of VRE by the power market [7].
(B) The creation of new congestion nodes inside DK1 and DK2. This may occur, e.g., because of
congestions in the substations that connect DS1 and DS3 with the transmission voltage cables.
Such an issue has already occurred for example in one of the transmission substations in Lolland
municipality, where Energinet had to contact the local DSO to achieve down regulation of wind
and solar power production. Currently this is only an issue for the transmission system operator
(TSO), but it is expected to become a problem for the DSOs as well [46].
(C) Additional electricity grid losses at the distribution level in areas with excess VRE. Grid losses
are proportional to the current (i.e., the power flow) and the distance that power is transported.
In a centralised fossil fuel energy system (where the electricity is transported from the central
power stations to the consumer through the transmission and distribution grids), the power
consumption in a given distribution grid can be seen as the cause of the power flow in that given
distribution grid and, consequently, of the grid losses in the given distribution grid too. However,
in a renewable energy system (where large shares of the power production may be fed directly
into the distribution grid and go upstream or downstream) the power flow in a given distribution
grid could be caused by power consumption elsewhere in the system. This is the case when the
local VRE production exceeds the local power consumption. In this sense, one could say that
local excess power production from VRE creates additional grid losses in the local distribution
grids where the excess power is produced.
Grid congestions between market zones or inside the market zone may be reduced by reinforcing
and expanding the electricity grid and/or increasing flexible demand inside the congestion node
through cross-sector integration. Increasing shares of VRE in neighbouring market zones and energy
systems reduces the effectiveness of the first two options and demands for more cross-sector integration.
Furthermore, cross-sector integration is expected to be strategic to decarbonise the H&C and transport
sectors [47]. Therefore, as argued in the theoretical approach, the coordination of investments in and
operations of VRE and cross-sector integration infrastructure (e.g., P2H in DH systems)—with regard
to time, size, and location—will be essential to reduce unnecessary grid expansion and reinforcement
(i.e., overinvestments in the electricity grid). At this point, it is important to highlight the relevance of
the location aspect to that end. The congestions between market zones may be reduced by both distant
and local cross-sector integration because it does not matter where the VRE production and the P2H
demand are located within DK1 and DK2. In contrast, distant cross-sector integration is not suitable to
address the congestions inside DK1 and DK2 because it cannot increase the flexible demand within the
new congestion zone. To this end, local cross-sector integration would be necessary. Behind-the-meter
cross-sector integration may also address the above mentioned congestion issues. However, it is not
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seen to be strictly necessary given that the congestion issues are not expected to happen at the wind
farm connection point. The reason is that the Danish institutional incentive system does not allow
DSOs to limit the connection of wind turbines and requires that DSOs make the necessary investments
in the grid to enable the connection of new wind farms [32]. This is to avoid the discrimination of
power producers.
Regarding the additional grid losses in areas with excess VRE, DSOs have expressed different
opinions. In Denmark, there is an “equalization scheme” between all the Danish DSOs that is used to
cover the additional grid investments and expenses related the connection of new wind turbines to
electricity distribution grids [32,45]. The DSO RAH Net states that the expenses related to the additional
grid losses are covered by the equalization scheme [32]. In contrast, the DSO NOE Net argues that the
scheme does not adequately cover the additional grid losses [45]. NOE Net adds that additional grid
losses have significantly increased in areas with high shares of VRE and raise the electricity bills of the
local consumers. NOE Net demands a reform of the scheme [45] and RAH Net points out that avoiding
long distance transportation of electricity would reduce grid losses [32]. In this respect, both local and
behind-the-meter cross-sector integration could provide a suitable solution to reduce additional grid
losses by increasing the local power demand in moments of excess VRE production.
Energinet pointed out that P2H has a strong seasonal profile [33]. Therefore, none of the cross-sector
integration cases considered in this study provides a full solution to the grid issues presented in this
section. Hence, other integration technologies (such as power-to-gas) are expected to be necessary
along with grid expansion and reinforcement [8,12,38].
3.1.3. Consumer Ownership and Local Acceptance of Wind Turbines
The majority of onshore wind turbines in Denmark have citizen ownership, which is very diverse
(see [11]). From the middle of the 1990s, a tendency for distant and exclusive commercial and citizen
ownership has been observed in the country, which significantly differs from the previous tendency
for local and inclusive citizen ownership [11]. The new ownership trend is one of the reasons for the
observed increase of local opposition to wind turbines [6,11].
In Denmark, 95% of the DH systems are owned either by a consumer cooperative or a municipal
company [11]. The interests of the local DH consumers are strongly represented in the boards of these
companies and profits are shared in the form of lower heat bills [27]. The implementation of new
turbines or the purchase of existing ones by these DH companies is dependent on a beneficial business
economy and the support of the local heat consumers. In the case of Hvide Sande, the purchase of the
wind turbines was approved in a general assembly in August 2018 [48]. This means that the ownership
of consumer and municipal DH companies in Denmark is local and inclusive [11]. Consequently, based
on the theoretical background presented in Section 2.2.2, the ownership of local wind turbines by such
local DH companies might bring some advantages with regard to local acceptance compared to the
general trend for exclusive and distant ownership observed for the separated ownership solutions [11],
where the local community has very limited decision power and access to benefits. The ownership of
local wind turbines by distant DH companies would not provide any advantage over the current trend.
When comparing the case of co-ownership with behind-the-meter cross-sector integration and the
case of co-ownership with local cross-sector integration, the former has advantages over the latter. In
the behind-the-meter case, the closest neighbours to the wind turbines are expected to be connected
to the DH system. In contrast, in a local cross-sector integration case, the wind turbines could be
placed away from the DH system, probably in the countryside, where the closest neighbours would
use individual heating [32]. In this case, the closest neighbours to the wind turbines, i.e., those that
will experience the local impacts the most, would not benefit from the ownership of the wind turbines
by the DH company. Such local imbalance between benefits and negative impacts should be addressed
in order to ensure local acceptance.
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3.1.4. The Attractiveness of VRE and P2H for DH Companies
The co-ownership of wind turbines and P2H by DH companies would improve the economy of
the wind turbines and the DH company because:
1. Coupling the wind turbines with the flexible demand of the DH system would to some extent
resolve the merit-order-effect and the curtailment problems when the wind turbines and the
flexible electricity demand are placed in the same congestion node [21].
2. Onshore wind turbines are the cheapest source of electricity in Denmark [49]. Therefore, it would
be cheaper for a flexible consumer to self-consume electricity from his wind turbines than buy
electricity from a wind power producer (either via the spot market or through peer-to-peer
trading). This is because, when buying electricity from a producer, the consumer would have to
pay for the cost of producing the wind power and for some benefits for the wind power producer.
DH companies who owned wind turbines in windy areas would have an additional advantage
because the levelised cost of wind power in these areas is even lower.
3. The DH system could be entitled to a reduction of electricity grid tariffs for the self-consumed
electricity based on the advantages it provides for the reduction of overinvestments in the
electricity grid expansion and reinforcement (see Section 3.1.2). In this sense, the co-ownership in
the behind-the-meter and local cross-sector integration cases would have an economic advantage
over the co-ownership in the distant cross-sector integration case.
3.1.5. Summary
This sub-section has analysed the (theoretical) ability of the cross-sector consumer ownership
solution implemented at the different location cases presented in Figure 2 to address the organisational
challenges of SESs. In the following, a summary of the results is provided.
The results support the argument for the need of coordinating investments (in VRE, P2H in DH
systems and the electricity grid) and operations (of VRE and P2H units) with regard to time, size,
and location in order to reduce overinvestments in the electricity grid when introducing high shares of
VRE. As suggested by the theoretical background, the necessary coordination is expected to be easier
in the co-ownership solution than in the separate ownership solution because the wind turbines are
regarded as one of the components of the DH system [22,29] and the decisions are made by one single
stakeholder, i.e., the DH company. Furthermore, the analysis emphasises the relevance of the location
aspects to reduce overinvestments in the grid. Both distant and local cross-sector integration are
suitable to reduce congestions in DK1 and DK2 but only local cross-sector integration may address the
local grid issues (i.e., the creation of new congestion nodes inside the market zones and the additional
grid losses in distribution grids with excess VRE). Behind-the-meter cross-sector integration does
contribute to alleviate the above mentioned issues too. However, it is not seen to be strictly necessary
given that the congestion issues are not expected to happen at the wind farm connection point.
The ownership of local wind turbines by local consumer- and municipal-owned DH companies
may enhance local acceptance as these companies have local and inclusive forms of citizen
ownership [11], as recommended by the theoretical background. Besides, the analysis indicates
that the behind-the-meter solution is better than the local cross-sector integration solution for local
acceptance. In the former, the closest neighbours to the wind turbines are expected be connected to the
DH system, whereas in the latter the wind turbines could be out in the countryside where the closest
neighbours would use individual heating instead.
Finally, the co-ownership is expected to increase the attractiveness for DH companies to invest
in wind turbines and P2H units, as suggested by the theoretical approach. This is particularly so in
windy areas, where the levelised cost of wind power is even lower than the country average, and with
behind-the-meter or local cross-sector integration solutions, where a higher reduction of electricity
grid tariffs for the self-consumed electricity could apply (based on the advantages they provide for the
reduction of overinvestments in the electricity grid expansion and reinforcement).
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All in all, it may be concluded that especially the local cross-sector integration case with the
co-ownership of wind turbines and P2H units by DH companies could (theoretically) provide several
benefits for the implementation of SESs in Denmark. These are reduction of overinvestments in grid
expansion and reinforcement, improved economic attractiveness of wind turbines and P2H units,
improved utilisation of local wind power, reduction of burning of fuels, better economy for the local DH
consumers, better economy for the local electricity consumers, and improved local acceptance of wind
turbines. Ultimately, this ownership model could have the potential to accelerate the implementation
of SESs. Therefore, it is deemed relevant to analyse the possibilities to implement it under the current
Danish incentive system.
3.2. The Current Institutional Incentive System for Cross-Sector Consumer Ownership in Denmark
This sub-section answers research question 2. The sub-section analyses how the current Danish
institutional incentive system encourages/discourages the different location cases of cross-sector
consumer ownership presented in Figure 2. In line with the interrelations presented in Figure 1, some
of the institutional incentives introduced in this section directly influence the implementation and
operation of the technical SES; others directly influence the actor participation and interaction in the
energy system; and, ultimately, all institutional incentives indirectly influence both. The analysis of the
institutional incentives is divided into the role and possibilities of electricity grid operators, electricity
grid tariffs and taxes, the design of the electricity spot market, and the lack of targeted incentives for
local cross-sector integration.
3.2.1. The Role and Possibilities of Electricity Grid Operators
Under the current legislation, grid operators’ are responsible for addressing grid congestion
issues, such as those that emerge from increasing shares of VRE or the electrification of the H&C and
transport sectors. However, the actions they may implement are limited to grid reinforcement and
expansion and to introduction of new grid tariffs, which need to be approved by the Danish Utility
Regulator. This means that the possibility for grid operators to promote, e.g., the necessary cross-sector
integration to reduce grid congestions caused by increasing shares of VRE is very limited and that
grid operators might be forced to overinvest in the electricity grid to address congestion issues. This
limitation is one of the reasons why the “electricity integration over distance” strategy [38] (i.e., the
expansion and reinforcement of the electricity grid) has been (and still is) the main VRE integration
strategy implemented in Denmark. This is illustrated, e.g., by the construction of two new transmission
connections to the Netherlands and the United Kingdom [50], whereas only 1.1% of the DH demand is
supplied by HPs [14].
3.2.2. Electricity Grid Tariffs, and Taxes
In Denmark, the electricity grid costs are distributed among consumers following the waterfall
principle. This means that the grid tariff to be paid by the consumer depends on the voltage level
of his electricity grid connection and that the consumer pays for the share of the grid expenses he
generates in his connection’s voltage level and all of the upper voltage levels. This principle was
adopted in a fossil fuel energy system, where electricity was produced centrally and transported to
the consumption point through transmission lines first and through distribution lines of decreasing
voltages afterwards, and where the consumer used all the upper voltage levels of the grid. However,
with an increasing share of power production being directly connected to the distribution grid and
flowing both downstream and upstream, the waterfall principle might not result in a fair distribution
of electricity grid costs for the consumers any longer. Furthermore, the waterfall principle implies that
a DH system will have to pay the same grid tariffs when self-consuming or purchasing electricity from
a nearby wind farm as when self-consuming or purchasing electricity from a distant wind farm [51].
However, the DH system that consumes electricity from a nearby wind farm in moments of excess
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electricity is helping to reduce grid costs, as concluded in Section 3.1.2. Hence, the discussion of new
cost distribution principles and grid tariffs becomes increasingly relevant.
In Denmark, the electricity taxes and grid tariffs (which, in the case of Hvide Sande, summed
approximately 70 EUR/MWh [22,52,53]) have made the private economy of P2H units for DH systems
worse than that of other alternatives (e.g., biomass boilers and solar collectors, for which taxes do not
apply)—even though the socio-economy of HPs is better [54]. As a result, only a few P2H units were
installed in the DH systems of the country up to 2018 [55], and their utilisation has been limited [29,30].
Nevertheless, new economic incentives have been recently introduced to promote P2H in DH systems.
These include the reduction of the electricity tax for heating from approximately 41 EUR/MWh to
21 EUR/MWh from 2021 [56]. In addition, in 2017–2018, approximately EUR 6.87 million in subsidies
were granted to DH companies with small-scale CHP units to cover up to 15% of the investment in an
electric HP. The subsidy was granted through application processes. In total, 29 projects summing
48.8 MW were granted and are supposed to be implemented in 2019–2020. The phasing out of the
public service obligation (PSO) electricity tax and the energy companies’ energy saving scheme are
also expected to improve the economy of DH HPs. [57–59] The new economic incentives are regarded
as a positive step towards the promotion of both distant and local cross-sector integration because
they are expected to result in several DH companies investing in HPs and a significant increase of the
annual hours of operation of the P2H units according to Hvide Sande DH, Ringkøbing DH, and EMD
International [29,30,34]. However, the actual positive impacts of the new institutional incentives for
P2H in DH systems are still to be seen and their sufficiency to be evaluated.
Regarding the co-ownership of wind turbines and P2H by DH companies, the institutional
economic incentives are different for behind-the-meter solutions and any technical solution that utilises
the public grid for the electricity consumption (i.e., distant and local cross-sector integration). Currently,
no electricity taxes or grid tariffs need to be paid for the wind power that is self-consumed in a
behind-the-meter solution [29]. This requires that both the wind turbines, the private cable, and the
P2H unit(s) are placed on the same land (with the same cadastral number) [29,51,60]. This requirement
significantly limits the potential for behind-the-meter cross-sector integration of wind turbines and
P2H in DH systems because wind turbines are usually placed in the countryside, away from the DH
systems [29,30,32]. Therefore, in many cases, the implementation of the behind-the-meter solution
would require the construction of DH pipelines to the wind farm (where the P2H unit would need to
be placed), which could significantly/totally reduce the attractiveness of the investment [30].
Full electricity grid tariffs and taxes need to be paid by the DH company for the electricity that is
self-consumed utilising the public grid [29], which completely discourages the co-ownership solutions
with distant and local cross-sector integration. Blanco et al. [22] studied the operation and system
costs of the DH system in Hvide Sande and assessed the impact of electricity taxes on the rate of
wind power that would be self-consumed/sold by the DH company. Their results show that, if the
total value of the applicable electricity taxes (about 48 EUR/MWh at that time) had to be paid for the
self-consumed electricity, 100% of the wind power production would be sold to the spot market. In
other words, it would be more expensive to self-consume wind power than sell the electricity at the
Nord Pool market and use the other energy sources and technologies to meet the heat demand instead.
The results obtained by Blanco et al. also show that, despite the additional revenue from the sale of
wind power, the total system costs would increase significantly compared to the situation where no
electricity taxes were paid for the self-consumed wind power.
3.2.3. The Design of the Electricity Spot Market
Denmark is part of the Nord Pool electricity market and has two market zones, DK1 and DK2.
Producers and consumers may trade through the Nord Pool market or directly between each other.
Peer-to-peer trading is possible as long as the producer and the consumer are placed within the same
market zone and the production and consumption occur simultaneously [51].
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In Section 3.1.4. it is argued that self-consuming wind power should be cheaper than buying
electricity from the Nord Pool market because onshore wind turbines are the cheapest source of
electricity in Denmark [49]. However, this does not apply under the current institutional incentive
system and with the current spot market design. Energinet [33] and Ringkøbing DH [30] pointed
out that the cheapest electricity prices do not necessarily match the periods with local wind resource
availability. Ringkøbing DH mentioned: “Other times the wind is not blowing here, but my boiler is
running and my price [for purchasing electricity at the Nord Pool market] is −125 DKK [per MWh]”;
this is about −17 EUR/MWh [30].
The levelised cost of onshore wind power in Denmark is about 35 EUR/MWh [49]. Figure 4
shows that the number of hours at the Nord Pool with spot market prices below that value has been
considerable in DK1 in the last years. Based on a preliminary analysis, the values suggest that it would
be unattractive for DH companies to invest in wind turbines, unless a reduction of grid tariffs and taxes
would apply for the self-consumed electricity. This was the case in Hvide Sande [29]. At the same time,
the values indicate that investments in wind turbines might not be attractive in a separate ownership
solution either, unless support schemes or other arrangements such as beneficial PPAs are in place.
This idea is supported by the results obtained and the conclusions drawn by Djørup et al. [17], who
further argue that “the current electricity market structure is not able to financially sustain the amounts
of wind power necessary for the transition to a 100% renewable energy system” (p. 148) in Denmark.
This means that, in order to further the implementation of wind power, the market structure will need
to be changed so that consumers pay at least the levelised cost of wind power and a reasonable profit
for the producer. After such a change, the self-consumed wind power should be cheaper than the
purchased wind power.
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Changes in e.g., ownership regulation, spatial planning regulation, the size of wind projects,
and the social normative perception of wind power have been identified as causes for the lowering of
wind projects with local and inclusive ownership in Denmark [11,62]. On top of that, the abolition of
feed-in tariffs in 2018 and the implementation of the tender scheme introduces an extra burden and
increased risk for (small) local initiatives [18,19] and could reduce their number even further. This
works against the goal of enhancing local acceptance of wind turbines.
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3.2.4. Lack of Specific Incentives for Local Cross-Sector Integration
There are no specifically targeted institutional incentives for local cross-sector integration or
local balancing. There is no economic incentive that encourages the activation of the flexible power
consumption in a given location within the specific market zone, nor any economic incentive to promote
a faster implementation of local cross-sector integration, e.g., in areas with very high/low shares of
VRE. This means that the institutional incentive system does not address the issue of the creation of
new congestion nodes inside DK1 and DK2 in any way [46], which could lead to overinvestments in
the electricity grid. The lack of incentives to address the issue could be explained by the fact that the
creation of new congestion nodes is not yet an important technical problem [7]. However, it is expected
to become a problem in the near future [46]. In fact, Energinet acknowledges that the distant/nearby
location of VRE and flexible electricity demand could have an impact in the grid and argues that the
electricity grid should not be “ignored” in the spatial planning of VRE and cross-sector integration
technologies [33].
3.2.5. Summary
This sub-section has analysed how the current Danish institutional incentive system
encourages/discourages the cross-sector consumer ownership at the different location cases presented
in Figure 2 (i.e., distant, local and behind-the-meter). The results presented in this section are in line
with the theoretical approach presented in Figure 1, which suggests that the institutional incentive
system influences the implementation and operation of SESs by encouraging/discouraging certain
technical and actor participation and interaction characteristics, which in turn influence each other.
All in all, it may be concluded that the current institutional incentive system has promoted
grid expansion and reinforcement over cross-sector integration for the introduction of VRE in the
electricity system [12]. This is seen as problematic given that the potential of this strategy is limited
as increasing shares of VRE are implemented in neighbouring market zones and energy systems.
Therefore, the cross-sector integration approach is expected to be essential to improve wind power
utilisation and business economy [9,12] and reduce overinvestments in the electricity grid [8]. The new
incentives for P2H in DH systems are seen as a positive step to promote distant and local cross-sector
integration, although the results of the policy are still to be seen and evaluated. However, the lack of
institutional incentives that specifically target local cross-sector integration in areas with high shares of
VRE is seen as problematic. This should change in order to address local grid issues (i.e., the creation
of new congestion nodes inside DK1 and DK2 and the additional grid losses in distribution grids in
areas with excess VRE).
The current institutional incentives do encourage to some extent the co-ownership of wind
turbines and P2H units by DH systems in a behind-the-meter solution by not applying any electricity
grid tariffs and taxes to self-consumed electricity. However, the cases where the behind-the-meter
solution may be implemented are very limited because of the requirement of having the wind turbines,
the private cable, and the P2H unit on the same piece of land (with the same cadastral number) [29,30].
In contrast, the current institutional incentives completely discourage the co-ownership with local or
distant cross-sector integration (i.e., the solutions where the public grid is used) by requiring that the
full electricity grid tariffs and taxes are paid for the self-consumed electricity [29].
It may be concluded that the current institutional incentive system seems to block all the benefits
that the co-ownership of wind turbines and P2H units by DH companies in a local cross-sector
integration solution could (theoretically) offer for the transition to a renewable SES.
3.3. Possibilities for Improving the Current Institutional Incentives
This sub-section answers research question 3. Based on the results presented in Section 3.1. and
Section 3.2, this sub-section introduces possible improvements for the current Danish institutional
incentive system. Most importantly, local cross-sector integration should be further promoted in order
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to avoid overinvestments in the electricity grid and improve wind economy. This would reduce the
electricity costs to be paid by the consumers. Several institutional incentives could be implemented to
that end:
• Geographical bids for the regulating power market in order to enable local balancing, as suggested
by Energinet [46] and EMD International [34].
• New (TSO and DSO) grid tariffs to activate flexible demand in a given location in periods of excess
electricity generation, as suggested by Ringkøbing DH [30]. “I can prove to them [to the local
DSO] mathematically that they would sell more electricity to me [and] make more money and
[that] I would make more DH to a lower price on the electrical boiler, if they lowered their price
[the electricity distribution tariff]” said Ringkøbing DH [30]. The reconsideration of the waterfall
principle for the distribution of grid costs would also be pertinent here.
• Subsidies on investments in VRE and/or P2H in targeted areas. The subsidies could be paid by
the savings that would be obtained from not having to reinforce or expand the electricity grid.
This could be facilitated by modifying the current legislation so that grid operators could promote
the implementation of cross-sector integration technology (on the right time, size and location),
when this wasestimated to be a more cost-effective solution from a socio-economic perspective.
Note that no analysis or assessment of the amount and location of the possible new congestion
nodes inside DK1 and DK2 has been found, which makes the present understanding of the problem
preliminary. Such thorough analysis would be necessary to evaluate which institutional incentive
measures would be needed/suitable to tackle the issue. Therefore, the above points should be
understood as interim suggestions that require further research in order to define concrete and final
policy recommendations.
The promotion of local cross-sector integration could target either the separate ownership solution
or the co-ownership solution analysed in this study or both of them. The results of the analysis of the
(theoretical) ability of cross-sector consumer ownership to address the challenges of SESs suggests that
the co-ownership solution has the additional advantage of improving wind utilisation and economy
and of enhancing local acceptance. Therefore, this preliminary analysis suggests that the co-ownership
solution should be promoted, e.g., through the reduction of grid tariffs and taxes, as suggested
by [22,29,30]. However, it would be advisable to increase the knowledge about the co-ownership
solution and its potential implications for the DH and electricity consumers before promoting it. EMD
International and Energinet expressed their concern about the fact that the DH company would not
pay grid tariffs and taxes [33], which would then need to be covered by other consumers and tax
payers [34]. This concern entails an implicit assumption that grid costs would not be reduced by
increasing the share of local utilisation of wind power. The results presented in Section 3.1.2. contradict
this assumption. In contrast, Hvide Sande DH understands that the production of heat with their
own wind turbines is similar to the production of heat with their own solar collectors—they do not
have to pay any taxes for the heating they produce from sun energy, nor for the heating they produce
from wind energy [29]. Furthermore, DH companies in Denmark do not pay taxes for the biomass
they consume either as result of political preferences. The above considerations and mismatch in
opinions/perspectives resembles the debates related to individual self-consumption (or individual
prosumers) that are taking place in the EU and other industrialised countries, here applied to collective
self-consumption (or collective prosumers). As mentioned, a more thorough analysis than the one
presented here would be necessary to shed light on this discussion and design adequate institutional
incentives for SESs.
Ringkøbing DH also pointed out that “the rules could be better [so that DH companies could own
wind turbines and reduce their fuel consumption] but, on the other hand, you know, we are very good
at operating the DH system, the HPs and the gas engines, and the CHP and all the pipes in the city
and so on. Sometimes when you start thinking on a new market, like you own the wind turbines also,
maybe you are not that good at that. Maybe some other guys are better at that” [30]. This comment
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holds an important observation about the potential need for DH companies to develop new core
competences for the transformation of the business model from a DH company into a smart energy
company. However, it shall be noted that many DH companies in Denmark already operate CHP
units, which means that they do have knowledge about the electricity market. Besides, the planning
of the wind turbine project could be done with the help of a specialised consultancy firm, like wind
cooperatives have usually done.
What it is clear is that the promotion of the co-ownership model together with the local cross-sector
integration solution should also include measures to create benefits for the nearby neighbours who are
not consumers of the DH systems. This could be achieved, e.g., by giving them the priority for the
purchase of the 20% of the shares that have to be offered to local residents by law [63] or by creating a
local wind foundation that would own a part of the wind farm and use the benefits for, e.g., supporting
energy renovations and investments in individual HPs outside the DH systems.
3.4. Future Perspectives for Research on Ownership and SESs
This sub-section answers research question 4. The sub-section introduces the issues regarding
ownership and SESs that have been identified for further research in this preliminary study.
The suitability of different ownership models to address the organisational challenges of
implementing and operating SESs are still rather unknown. This article contributes to build up
the knowledge on the topic. However, the results are not conclusive on whether or not local consumer
ownership has a higher ability than other ownership models to facilitate and coordinate investments
and operations, as suggested by Hvelplund and Djørup [3]. The hypothesis should be tested using a
broader scope of the technical (smart) energy system than the one chosen for this exploratory study
and in different contexts of actor participation and interaction.
Besides, cross-sector ownership is still rather unknown for medium- and large-scale energy
systems. Possibly the only exemption here is CHP plants connected to DH systems. This is not
surprising given that cross-sector integration is at early stages even in countries and local regions
challenged by the current high shares of VRE. Interesting enough, the idea of cross-sector ownership
could have some potential for SESs, as concluded in this article. This opens up for investigating the
possibility for energy companies to transition from single-sector energy companies to smart energy
companies. Many DH companies in Denmark own CHP plants and, therefore, already provide two
energy products, i.e., electricity and heat. In a similar way, the local electricity company or the (current)
local wind cooperative could own, e.g., wind turbines, HPs, and electrolysers to supply electricity,
heat and hydrogen. It would be relevant to analyse further whether owning a cross-sector energy
technology portfolio would provide any competitive advantage in a renewable energy system and
under which institutional incentive system. If so, the necessary organisational innovation and strategies
to implement it would also be of relevance for further research. This could lead to considerations about
bundling of energy sectors and/or (some) services, which would require to assess the implications
for energy consumers and study the legal implementation. In this line, it would be advisable to
study under which circumstances the smart energy company should or should not be allowed to
include a natural monopoly (i.e., electricity, DH, and gas grids) in the portfolio based on the potential
implications for the consumers.
4. Discussion
This article presents an exploratory analysis of an interdisciplinary character for which only a
few stakeholders have been interviewed. These are the ones that are considered relevant according to
the theoretical approach presented in Figure 1 and they are mainly connected to the case of Hvide
Sande, which, to the best knowledge of the author, is the only existing case in Denmark for now.
Interviewing other DSOs, DH companies, and wind turbine companies could provide a more detailed
understanding about the studied issues and show any strong, fair, or weak agreements/disagreements
with the views/information collected in this study. Interviewing other DSOs would be necessary, e.g.,
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to find out the general opinion on the equalization scheme and on its adequacy to cover the expenses
related to additional distribution grid losses in areas with excess VRE. In addition, it might help to get
an idea about where the new congestion nodes inside DK1 and DK2 might appear and the seriousness
of this issue. Interviewing other DH companies would be necessary, e.g., to find out their opinion on
and interest in investing in wind turbines and their plans for investing in HPs after the new economic
incentives. Therefore, a more thorough analysis, based on interviews with a larger number of these
stakeholders, would result in better-grounded policy recommendations. Apart from that, interviewing,
e.g., DH consumers, the Danish Utility Regulator, the Tax Ministry, or the Energy Ministry would make
it possible to collect these stakeholders’ opinion on the analysed ownership model and the interim
policy recommendations. Furthermore, the study could be extended to include other technologies
(e.g., electrolysers) and other countries (e.g., the EU Member States). However, these are out of the
scope of the exploratory analysis presented here.
In spite of the limitations of the chosen theoretical approach and methods, this study is sufficient
to show that the location of VRE and sector integration infrastructure (e.g., P2H) does matter when it
comes to the development of the electricity grid and the attractiveness of investments in VRE. This
is in line with knowledge about grid congestion (see, e.g., [7]) and about innovative forms to reduce
wind curtailment (see, e.g., [21]), presented in the theoretical approach. The study is also sufficient to
show the advantages of the co-ownership with the behind-the-meter solution (when the wind turbines
and the DH system are close enough) to enhance the attractiveness of investments in wind turbines
and P2H units as well as local acceptance of wind turbines in Denmark. Moreover, the study suggests
that, under an improved institutional incentive system, the co-ownership with the local cross-sector
integration solution could also provide these benefits. However, further research is necessary to
understand the full implications of such ownership model and define suitable institutional incentives
to promote local cross-sector integration either with co-ownership, with separate ownership, or both.
The study takes as the point of departure an empirical case in Denmark. Here the material resources,
the cultural and cognitive characteristics, the political process and system, and the institutional system
may diverge from the conditions in other EU countries and therefore also result in other technical and
organisational solutions for the energy system, as indicated by Figure 1 in the theoretical approach. In
Denmark, wind power provides almost half of the final annual electricity demand [13] and onshore
wind power is the cheapest source of electricity [49]. Denmark has a rather decentralised electricity
system (with about 50% of the electricity production directly fed into the distribution grids [40]), which
has required and resulted in stronger distribution grids than in other EU countries [7]. Moreover,
the Danish electricity system is very well connected to the neighbouring countries through transmission
cables [41,42] and has a high integration of DH [14]. Obviously, this puts Denmark in an advantageous
position when it comes to handling high shares of VRE compared to other EU countries. Furthermore,
the potential within the present Danish technological configuration for the ownership of wind turbines
by DH companies is larger than in other countries where, e.g., the shares of DH are still low or the
cheapest electricity source is another, e.g., hydropower. Nevertheless, the understanding of how
different location cases of cross-sector integration (using different technologies) could reduce electricity
grid expansion and reinforcement needs while creating the necessary space for high shares of VRE
and the electrification of the H&C and transport sectors is as relevant in other EU countries [8]. One
could even think that EU countries with weaker electricity grids could significantly benefit from early
considerations regarding locational aspects of cross-sector integration. In this respect, they could find
suitable organisational solutions for cross-sector integration that helped avoid overinvestments in
the grid. Moreover, a larger deployment of DH systems is recommended to decarbonise the H&C
sector [64] and to reduce the costs of integrating high shares of VRE [8] in the EU.
It should also be highlighted that citizen ownership in general and consumer ownership in
particular is much more common in Denmark than in many EU countries [65]. As other EU countries
advance towards more decentralised energy systems and with EU energy policies that aim at putting
the consumer at the centre of the energy transition and at increasing open and participatory forms of
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citizen ownership for renewable energy projects, increasing shares of consumer ownership could be
expected across the EU too. In this regard, advancing the understanding about on-site and off-site
collective prosumers and the advantages and disadvantages they offer in a context of developing
renewable SESs becomes increasingly important for all EU Member States. On the other hand, it is
important to note that the regulation and ownership of DH systems and companies is very diverse
in the EU [66,67]. This means that, in other EU countries, DH ownership is not necessarily local
and inclusive, i.e., local DH consumers might have little or no power over the decisions of the DH
company and the reduction of DH system costs might not be reflected in the heat bills of the consumers.
Consequently, the ownership of local wind turbines by the DH company that owns the local DH system
might not enhance local acceptance of wind turbines in other EU countries.
Finally, it shall be noted that the current regulation that dictates unbundling of energy
sectors/services could be an impediment to implementing cross-sector ownership solutions such
as the one presented in this study in other EU countries. On the other hand, this does not mean that the
existing regulation should define/limit the organisational solutions of the future if innovative options
are proven beneficial to meet the societal goals of the transition to a renewable energy system.
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